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Brian Easton 
I begin this paper with a manufacturer’s warning: that I use 
the term ‘regulation’ slightly differently from the way it is 
used in some other papers presented in this symposium, 
coming as I do as an economist from the tradition of 
mathematical systems analysis. By that tradition’s standards, 
a market is a regulatory system, so it finds limiting the use 
of the term ‘regulation’ to just statutes and the regulations 
that are derived from them. It also recognises that some 
administrative practices are regulatory. The legal framework 
for regulation may be quite adequate but the administrators 
may fail to implement it effectively. So when I write about the 
global financial crisis being a result of regulatory failure  
I am allowing that the law, the market and the administration 
may all have had a role in that failure. Thus the statement has 
little informational content; its importance is that when we 
try to disentangle what happened, or remedy it, we do not 
concentrate on one element of the regulatory system: they are 
intricately interrelated.
Regulatory  
Lessons from the 
Leaky Home 
Experience
Brian Easton is an independent scholar, and has published numerous 
books and articles on a wide range of economic and social issues.
Behind this is a view that much public 
policy is concerned with designing or 
improving the regulatory system of 
the economy (and sometimes of non-
economic activities). Typically, the 
change is not the imposition or removal 
of regulation, but a modification of the 
current regulatory system to one which is 
intended to be more effective. In particular 
the so-called ‘deregulation’ of 1984–1994 
is better thought of as a change in the 
overall regulatory system, with greater 
emphasis on market regulation. Hence 
my preference for calling this ‘market 
liberalisation’. Even the most extreme 
proponents of this liberalisation knew 
that there was a need for law to enable the 
effective working of markets. 
Humpty Dumpy said that he could 
make words mean what he chose them to 
mean. While that may be true, the danger 
is that others will misunderstand what 
their meaning is and that they get trapped 
into sterile and misleading uses. That has 
happened, I think, with ‘regulation’.
The size of economic crises
I do not propose to give much attention to 
the global financial crisis, whose regulation 
is outside the scope of this symposium. 
But we might note that its direct costs to 
the United States government from the 
bail-outs are estimated at US$90 billion, 
or about 0.6% of US annual output. The 
equivalent cost in New Zealand would be 
NZ$1.1 billion. The cost of fixing leaky 
buildings is put at least ten times as 
much. There are a variety of estimates, 
depending on assumptions, but currently 
the lowest is NZ$11.3 billion (i.e. 6 % of 
annual GDP), with estimates going up to 
$33 billion (18% of annual GDP), based 
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on 110,000 dwellings costing an average of 
$300,000 to fix or replace.
Comparing the two figures is not 
quite right, since the American one 
does not include the private costs of the 
crisis, and the leaky building figure does 
not include health and trauma costs. 
However, the comparison does suggest 
that the failure to build watertight homes 
is an economic disaster comparable in 
magnitude locally to the global financial 
crisis internationally.
Thus, the leaky buildings episode is a 
major instance of regulatory failure in New 
Zealand. This paper uses the experience 
to evaluate the proposed Regulatory 
Responsibility Bill.
Leaky homes: the beginnings 
There is no authoritative account of how 
the leaky building syndrome (LBS) arose. 
Here follows a sketch, with particular 
attention to the role of regulation. 
Home construction is a long- 
established industry, which historically 
might be characterised as a craft one. 
Technology was slowly changing, 
and learning was on the job, with an 
increasingly formalised system of 
apprenticeship training. Quality control 
was by reputation, by professional 
membership of organisations such as 
the Master Builders Association (which 
has been around for over 100 years), and 
by local government which approved 
plans and had building inspectors check 
a builder’s work. Typically the inspectors 
were retired builders – retired perhaps 
because of physical infirmity but very 
knowledgeable about building practices. 
(The role of the building inspector was 
nicely recalled by one person who said the 
builder of his now 30-year-plus-old home 
was described by his building inspector as 
‘your friend’. No doubt some builders took 
a less charitable view of the inspector.) 
Some new housing also involved architects 
or engineers. 
Until the late 1980s, local authority 
by-laws prescribed the manner in 
which construction was to be carried 
out, although different councils 
prescribed different building methods, a 
heterogeneity which the building industry 
found unsatisfactory. Of course mistakes 
were made, but they were not widespread 
and the building industry learned from 
them and corrected its methods. 
From about the 1970s the rate of 
technological innovation in house 
construction began to accelerate. How 
the innovations were incorporated into 
the building programme is not clear. 
Probably at some point it became evident 
that ‘learning on the job’ would no longer 
be sufficient to ensure that the new 
technologies could be used effectively, 
although it is not clear what happened 
instead. By 1979 the innovation challenge 
was sufficiently serious to be mentioned 
in public fora. 
Various institutions had been 
developed to protect new house 
purchasers, including the Building 
Performance Guarantee Corporation. This 
was decommissioned in 1987. By doing 
this the government may have markedly 
reduced the Crown’s financial exposure 
to risk from poor quality building and, 
with hindsight, the enormous LBS bill. 
Had the Building Performance Guarantee 
Corporation existed in the 1990s, it might 
have identified the problem earlier or even 
encouraged better standards of building. 
(The parallel here is the Earthquake and 
War Damage Corporation (now the 
Earthquake Commission), which has 
insufficient funds to deal with a major 
earthquake but deals expeditiously 
with the consequences of smaller ones, 
while pursuing an active programme of 
prevention.) 
Another institution disestablished in 
the late 1980s was the Ministry of Works 
and Development. This decision is usually 
seen as reflecting the downgrading of 
engineering relative to accounting in 
the priorities of policy makers. The 
extent to which it had an impact on the 
housing construction sector is unclear, 
so it is uncertain whether the LBS can be 
grouped with the Cave Creek tragedy and 
the Auckland CBD blackout. However, 
the Ministry of Works and Development’s 
disestablishment symbolises the fact 
that engineering standards became less 
significant in public policy thinking. 
Some of the functions of the 
ministry, including those involving 
housing construction, were transferred 
to the Department of Internal Affairs 
which established a Building Industries 
Commission, whose 1990 report is 
discussed below.
Other events of the 1980s also 
contributed to the concatenation which 
led to the LBS. One was the reform of 
local government, which must have led 
to upheaval in many planning approval 
offices and among building inspectors. 
There is a view that funding was reduced, 
so there was poorer supervision. A second 
was the labour market upheaval in the late 
1980s, as many manufacturing workers 
were laid off, which may have resulted in 
many under-qualified workers becoming 
self-employed builders. A third was the 
reduction in apprenticeship training.
Leaky buildings: the 1990s 
In January 1990 the Department of Internal 
Affairs’ Building Industry Commission 
reported. Its general recommendations 
were incorporated in a bill introduced into 
parliament by the Labour government 
later in the year, to be passed under the 
National government, with bipartisan 
agreement, as the Building Industry 
Act 1991. Instructively for this story, the 
report’s proposal to reintroduce something 
[In the 1990s] The system of regulating dwelling 
construction was changed dramatically through a  
building code which set performance criteria to be 
achieved rather than prescribing the manner in which 
buildings were to be constructed. 
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like the recently disestablished Building 
Performance Guarantee Corporation was 
not proceeded with.
The system of regulating dwelling 
construction was changed dramatically 
through a building code which set 
performance criteria to be achieved rather 
than prescribing the manner in which 
buildings were to be constructed. For 
instance, builders were told just that the 
structure must last 50 years, the cladding 
15 years, and that the walls and roofs must 
be impermeable to water. The belief was 
that the old regime had stifled the use of 
new materials, design and construction, 
thereby discouraging innovation 
and raising building costs. Under the 
new regime new methods would be 
introduced more easily. The minister in 
charge of the bill, Graham Lee, who was 
once a builder, said its most important 
element was the development of private 
building inspectors. (If only that had been 
correct.) 
The act came into force in 1992 with 
the introduction of the Building Code. 
There is a view that the code was the 
‘cause’ of LBS. However, as the preceding 
section indicates, there were numerous 
factors coming together which led to the 
failure.
The early 1990s was a period when the 
market extremists were still triumphant, 
and there was frequent reference to ‘light-
handed regulation’, referring to a regulatory 
system in which the government is not 
very active but the regulation is based 
upon normal market practices, including 
litigation for breach of contract (perhaps 
under the Consumer Guarantees Act in 
cases where the contract was not very 
elaborate). Ideally, the threat of litigation 
is sufficient to ensure that the contractor 
maintains the agreed standards. 
It appears that little thought was 
put into considering the issue of what 
redress the house owner would have if the 
performance standards were not attained. 
Suppose the cladding fell off after 14 
years? Under light-handed regulation the 
aggrieved party can take the matter to 
litigation, but who exactly is to be sued? 
The above account suggests that there are 
many involved, and all, to some extent, may 
be at fault: the local authority, its building 
inspector, the builder, the architect, the 
buildings material supplier, the developer, 
the home owner who onsold, and even the 
legislators and their advisers who passed 
the relevant legislation. In such situations 
fault can be very difficult to establish in 
law. A favoured explanation is James 
Reason’s ‘Swiss cheese causative model’, 
in which there are a series of slices with 
holes in them and a particular untoward 
event occurs when there is an alignment 
of the holes. While this may be useful for 
explaining a single event, its relevance to 
explaining a repeated failure is less clear. 
The LBS involves thousands – perhaps 
over 100,000 – homes. Alignment of 
the holes in all these cases cannot be an 
unfortunate coincidence. The failure was 
systemic. 
Given so many potential groups at 
fault, and given that the building failures 
took time to identify, that litigation is not 
always quick, that many of those involved 
will have passed on and companies will 
have disappeared, and that in any case 
they cannot possibly collectively find 
the $11–$33 billion required to fix the 
problem, outcomes for the victims of 
LBS have frequently been unsatisfactory 
and costly. (Suing the government is 
not really an option. Parliament is too 
clever to allow that, yet many think the 
government of the day has the greatest 
culpability – although were it to own up it 
would be the taxpayer who would pay. In 
any case the current Minister for Building 
and Construction has said (New Zealand 
Herald, 27 February 2010) that the fiscal 
realities are that even the government’s 
pockets are not that deep.)
The Swiss cheese model which might 
be useful for a particular court case is not 
particularly helpful when the cases get 
repeated. In the end one must ask why 
there was no self-correcting mechanism. 
Or, to use a much-loved New Zealand 
image, why there was inadequate fencing 
at the top of the cliff instead of relying on 
courts at the bottom. 
The LBS appears to be associated 
with at least two innovations which, no 
doubt, were cost-saving at the time. The 
first was the use of a ‘monolithic cladding’ 
which has proved not to be watertight 
unless it was used strictly according to 
specification. The second was the use of 
untreated timber, without the realisation 
that treating for borer also better sealed 
the wood from water. Additionally, some 
house designers cut back water-protecting 
features such as eaves.
The problems of construction may 
not be confined to leaky homes. They 
extend to apartments and may involve 
commercial buildings. The collapse of the 
apprenticeship system and the operation 
of some not-very-qualified builders has 
meant that the quality of the workmanship 
has not always been high. The use of other 
new materials, often imported – following 
the ending of import controls – means 
that poor and unsustainable construction 
may plague other elements of the housing 
stock in a manner similar to leaky houses.
Ironically, the LBS should not have 
been as much of a surprise as it was. The 
Canadians experienced it too, but a little 
earlier. I have heard it claimed that there 
were people who knew of the construction 
failures long before they were a public 
issue, but their response was inadequate. 
If that is true, then a further regulatory 
failure was that there was a political 
environment in which individuals were 
discouraged from speaking out. 
We might summarise the conclusion 
by noting that when Marcellus in Hamlet 
... litigation is not always quick, ... many of those 
involved will have passed on and companies will have 
disappeared, and ... in any case they cannot possibly 
collectively find the $11–$33 billion required to fix the 
problem ...
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said ‘Something is rotten in the state of 
Denmark’, he was not referring to the 
buildings but to the governance.
The Major Projects
The LBS may not be the greatest regulatory 
failure in to New Zealand’s economic 
history – even ignoring macroeconomic 
crises such as the Great Depression, which, 
in any case, can be attributed to a severe 
external shock arising from offshore 
regulatory failure. Although there is no 
authoritative estimate of the collective 
cost to the economy of the energy-based 
Major Projects (Think Big) programme, it 
is likely to have been of a similar order of 
magnitude as leaky buildings.
The Major Projects taught some of us 
an important lesson. In the early 1980s, 
considerable effort was put into evaluating 
the public return on the investments and 
there was much debate on the criteria to 
measure this. However, with hindsight we 
know the evaluation exercises missed the 
point. Suppose the assumptions were not 
fulfilled. Who would bear the cost of the 
failure? 
Those doing the evaluations in the 
private sector were unaware that the 
downside risks were not borne equally, 
while those in the public sector, who did 
know, did not seem to have taken these 
asymmetries into account. In particular, 
it turned out that if there were cost over-
runs (there were some), or the world 
price of oil was lower than projected (as 
it proved to be), the cost of the failure 
was borne almost entirely by taxpayers 
and consumer-motorists, because the 
corporate investors had their returns 
guaranteed – one way and another – by 
the state. 
There is a parallel here with the 
leaky buildings. As in the case of the 
development of the Building Code, 
insufficient attention was paid to what 
would happen if something went wrong. It 
is true that in both cases there were means 
to settle the failure. In the case of the Major 
Projects the financial deficits were covered 
by taxpayers and motorists. In the case of 
leaky buildings, a slow, cumbersome and 
expensive process of litigation is settling 
the costs of redress erratically. Part is 
borne by the house owner, part by the 
private suppliers and the local authorities, 
with the central government offering to 
pay about 10%. Many would say that the 
costs are not being borne equitably. 
Murphy’s law and regulatory assessment
This is all a nice example of Murphy’s law. 
Not the ‘if anything can go wrong, it will’ 
version, but Edward Murphy’s original 
aim to design a system on the assumption 
that anything which can go wrong will 
go wrong. I doubt that this thought was 
uppermost in the minds of the designers 
of the Building Code, and I don’t recall 
much attention to it in the evaluation of 
the Major Projects. 
Of course, accident prevention cannot 
be all-encompassing. Murphy was in 
the aircraft industry trying to minimise 
crashes; the easiest way to do this is to 
not let planes fly. Similarly, there are 
going to be some risks from the building 
code. However, a lot of grief could have 
been prevented had its designers asked 
‘if things go wrong, what happens next?’ 
That so few aircraft crashes have occurred 
compared to the total number of flights, 
and that even fewer have led to death, 
indicates the value of the design principle 
that Murphy enunciated.
Should we build Murphy’s design 
principle into our policy process? The 
evidence is that we have often not done 
so in the past. As far as I can judge, it is 
not there in current policy evaluation, 
and it was certainly not in terms of the 
two major regulatory failures I have just 
identified. 
The Major Projects were handled 
outside the legal process as entirely an 
administrative matter. As it happens, some 
of the omissions are covered by the 1989 
Public Finance Act, in so far as the risks 
the government exposed itself to should 
now appear as contingent liabilities in 
the government accounts. However, I 
am not sure whether the guarantees the 
government gave, which ended up as 
additional costs to motorists, are covered 
by the new procedures. The precise 
guarantees could not occur today, because 
of the greater use of market regulation 
– such as there being no restrictions 
on imports of oil. They resulted in tax 
increases which would not have been 
anticipated at the time of the agreement, 
and so would not be mentioned under the 
contingent liabilities provisions.
However, the LBS, with the benefit 
of hindsight, is very revealing as to the 
inadequacy of our approach to regulation 
in the early 1990s. It demonstrates that 
‘light-handed regulation’ with recourse to 
the courts if there is failure may not always 
be an adequate answer. 
Regulatory impact analysis
Suppose the Building Industries Act and 
the Building Code had been reviewed 
under the current regulatory impact 
analysis procedures. It would be too much 
to expect the review to forecast the LBS, 
but reasonable questions, like our earlier 
one – what if the cladding fell off the house 
after 14 years? – would have anticipated the 
issue of what happens if the construction 
did not meet the performance standards 
in the code. (Note the importance of 
the time horizon: if the cladding fell off 
during the construction process there is a 
reasonably effective redress process.)
The checklist in the Treasury’s 
Regulatory Impact Analysis Handbook 
is set out in the appendix to this 
article. While each of its items may be 
reasonable in its own right, at no point 
is the evaluator asked to consider what 
might go wrong and what would be the 
consequences if that happened. The 
... accident prevention cannot be all-encompassing.  
Murphy was in the aircraft industry trying to minimise 
crashes; the easiest way to do this is to not  
let planes fly.
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analysis is not interested in what redress 
process might be triggered if something 
goes wrong. (One colleague argued that 
the going-wrong issue is implicitly in the 
handbook, and she explicitly teaches it in 
her training sessions. So much the better 
for her students, but I have no doubt the 
checklist dominates consultants’ thinking 
when they are doing regulatory impact 
reports.)
The handbook is a lineal descendant 
of the project evaluation approach that 
was used in the Major Project appraisals. 
It does not require a cost-benefit analysis 
(although these are sometimes included 
for particular cases), but it adds the sort 
of caveat analysis which should be done 
with a cost-benefit analysis (but was often 
not in the early 1980s). The handbook 
shows no evidence of having learned the 
chief lesson of the application of cost-
benefit analysis to the Major Projects – to 
ask what happens if things go wrong? The 
basis of the approach seems to be that ‘the 
policy will work, but there may be some 
collateral impacts. Please identify them.’ 
Thus, the handbook approach would have 
done nothing to prevent the LBS, nor the 
enormous costs which it has generated. 
The proposed Regulatory Responsibility Bill
The Regulatory Responsibility Taskforce 
submitted a Regulatory Responsibility Bill 
in September 2009. Again we ask: would 
the bill, were it a statute at the time, have 
done anything to prevent or forewarn of 
the inadequacies of the Building Act and 
the Building Code?
Again, the answer is no. The bill 
establishes a set of principles, not one of 
which addresses the issue of what happens 
if some statute or regulation fails to deliver 
on its intent. From this perspective the 
proposed Regulatory Responsibility Bill is 
ineffective. It would not have made a single 
difference to the adoption of the Building 
Act or the Building Code, nor resulted in 
a single additional watertight home. This 
is surely a major test of its relevance. If 
the proposed bill would have been useless 
for dealing with one of our greatest past 
crises, it is unlikely to be much use for 
preventing future ones.
One could well argue that that is not 
the intention of the bill, whose purpose 
is described as ‘to improve the quality 
of Acts of Parliament and other kinds 
of legislation by specifying principles of 
responsible regulation ... and requiring 
those proposing new legislation to state 
whether the legislation is compatible with 
those principles ... and granting courts 
the power to declare legislation to be 
incompatible with those principles’. If so, 
the bill has the wrong name, not only in 
terms of the definition of regulation given 
earlier in this article, but also in terms 
of the normal meanings of the narrow 
legalistic term regulation. Its title is a 
Humpty Dumpty exercise of choosing a 
phrase which appears to mean something 
quite different to the public generally. I 
leave others to find a more appropriate 
name, but the proposed bill seems to me 
to be more one about legislative process 
than one about regulatory responsibility.
This failure is all the more surprising 
given that three of the members of the 
taskforce were deeply involved with the 
Major Projects. They were on the side of 
the angels, but are repeating the previous 
Will any policy options that may be considered, potentially
•	 Take	or	impair	existing	private	property	rights?
•	 Affect	the	structure	or	openness	of	a	particular	market	or	industry?
•	 Impact	on	the	environment,	such	as	regulations	that	affect	the	use	and	
management	of	natural	resources?
•	 Have	any	significant	distributional	or	equity	effects?	…
•	 Alter	the	human	rights	or	freedoms	of	choice	and	action	of	individuals?
•	 Have	any	other	significant	costs	or	benefits	on	businesses,	individuals	
or	not-for-profit	organisations?	…
Is the evidence-base for the effectiveness of different policy options 
weak or absent?
Are the expected benefits or costs of the policy options likely to be 
highly uncertain?
Is the success of any of the options likely to be dependent on other 
policy initiatives or legislative changes?
Are any of the legislative options likely to have flow-on implications 
for the future form or effectiveness of related legislation?
Are any of the legislative options likely to be novel, or unprecedented?
Are any of the legislative options likely to be inconsistent with 
fundamental common law principles?
Are any of the legislative options likely to be inconsistent with New 
Zealand’s international obligations, or New Zealand’s commitment 
toward a single economic market with Australia?
Are any of the legislative options likely to include a new power to 
create delegated legislation, or grant a broad discretionary power to 
a public body?
Are any of the legislative options likely to include provisions that 
depart from existing legislative norms for like issues or situations?
Are there other issues with the clarity or navigability of, or costs 
of compliance with, the current legislation that it might be good to 
address at the same time?
Will people with expertise in implementation provide input on the 
policy design before policy decisions are taken?
Are implementation timeframes likely to be challenging?
Are the actual costs or benefits highly dependent on the capability or 
discretionary action of the regulator?
Appendix: Checklist in the Regulatory Impact Analysis Handbook (pp.33-4)
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mistake by assuming that the intent of 
the policy will be carried out, rather than 
asking what happens if the policy outcome 
is different from the intent. As the taskforce 
report makes clear, this proposal belongs 
to the same stable as regulatory impact 
analysis, the lineal descendent of the cost-
benefit analysis which was so misleading 
during the Major Projects debate.
Conclusion: the Murphy gap
What this paper has identified is a major 
gap in the formal policy process. Let 
us call it the ‘Murphy gap’. There is not 
built into the policy process a test of 
what happens when a policy outcome 
differs from that which was promised. Of 
course it is rare for promises to be exactly 
attained, but what we have shown is that 
in the case of the Building Code (and the 
Major Projects) the failure was very large 
– gigantic. While in principle it could have 
been anticipated, it was not. 
Neither the Regulatory Impact 
Analysis Handbook nor the proposed 
Regulatory Responsibility Bill address 
the Murphy gap. One might argue that by 
ignoring it, and yet giving the impression 
that they provide a comprehensive review 
of regulatory impact, they exacerbate it by 
complacency. 
Who knows whether a current or 
future piece of legislation (and associated 
regulations) may result in a failure with 
an economic impact the size of the Major 
Projects, the LBS or the global financial 
crisis? There is still no systematic way 
of such a possibility being brought to 
the attention of those who are passing 
or implementing the laws. From this 
perspective, the proposed bill is irrelevant 
as a means of improving regulatory 
responsibility. 
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